The 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments require that water utilities mail drinking water quality reports to their customers annually. The public uses this information; the news of a water quality violation makes a household 21% more likely to purchase bottled water in the following year.We measure reports of violations with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) data about violation reports from 1,300 water utilities, with a service population of approximately 10 million people total. We measure the consumer response using the Consumer Expenditure (CEX) survey from 2006-2008 with 10,874 households, and we match consumers to utilities geographically. JEL Codes: Q25, Q53
Introduction
Water quality is a serious public health concern for the developed world; according to the New York Times (Duhigg [2009] ), as many as 19 million Americans become ill due to parasites, viruses, and bacteria in drinking water each year. The 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments (SD-WAA96) require that the public be informed about drinking water contaminants through annual reports. We find that the public uses this information: a report of a water quality violation issued by a local utility induces consumers to be 21% more likely to purchase bottled water in the following year. This implies about .8 million Americans started drinking bottled water because of reported violations.
In the sections that follow, we review the literature on drinking water quality information (section 2); describe the data (section 3); show our Probit and two-step Heckman regressions (section 4); and briefly conclude with policy implications (section 5).
Literature
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the relevant academic literature. Based on a survey of households in Boston, Smith and Desvousges [1986] report that nearly 30% of their sample self-report that they purchase bottled water to avoid hazardous waste, and news of hazardous waste statistically significantly determines bottled water purchases. In a similar study about Georgia residents, Abrahams et al. [2000] find 23% consider tap water somewhat unsafe or unsafe, and about 32% show their satisfaction with their water quality. The authors show that concerns about the safety and tap water quality are important determinants but, in contrast to our results, they find notification of local water problems with tap water is not significant determinant in the decision to buy bottled water. A few years later, unlike Abrahams et al. [2000] , Jakus et al. [2009] found that directly perceived water quality (taste, smell, clarity) has a greater influence than perceived risk in prompting people to buy bottled water in the decision. But, all else equal, those with greater perceived risks are willing to spend more money on bottled water than those with lower perceived risks. 1 In a working paper similar to ours, Zivin et al. [2011] use bottled water consumption as a measure of consumer avoidance of tap water in the presence of SDWAA96 violations and find, like we do, that this impact is significant. Their measure of bottled water consumption differs from ours: while we use Consumer Expenditure survey data representative of one third of the U.S. population, they use data from what appears to be 200 grocery stores in northern CA and NV (compared to approximately ten thousand households which we are able to use). They focus on month-by-month announcements of water violations, and seek an immediate effect of consumer behavior on bottled water consumption, while we rely on the the annual Water Quality Reports as the means by which consumers would learn of violations. Their data, therefore, is richer in the time dimension but sparser cross-sectionally. They find expenditures on bottled water increased by 17 to 22 percent upon receiving news of a violation, which is comparable of our result, which finds consumers are 21 more likely to purchase bottled water upon receiving news of a violation. Bennear and Olmstead [2008] study the impact of WQRs mailed to consumers brought about by SDWAA96, but look at water suppliers' response, not consumer response. They find that utilities required to mail these WQRs reduced their violations by between 30 and 44%.
According to Jalan et al. [2003] , measures of awareness such as schooling and exposure to mass media have statistically significant effects on adoption of different home purification methods in India. In contrast to our work, most researchers have used information measures from non-health related water quality and reported beliefs about health risks, so has less to say about a public information campaign such as one as undertaken by the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments. Two papers are similar to ours, in that they involve a public information campaign. Madajewicz et al. [2007] tested the water in each of 6,500 wells across Bangladesh; they then labeled each well as safe or unsafe and reported the result to the users of the well: people with labeled unsafe wells are over four times as likely to change to another well within one year. Jalan and Somanathan [2008] selected households in an Indian city, informed people whether their drinking water had tested positive for fecal contaminant. Non-purifying households who learned that their water is "dirty" are 11 percentage points more likely to change their averting behavior than households who received no information.
Apart from a subject of drinking water quality, consumer response to information that has been addressed in different topics such as eco-labeling (Teisl et al. [2002] ), food safety concerns (Piggott and Marsh [2004] ), price information on water bills (Gaudin [2006] ), and different formats of water quality reports (Johnson [2003] ). Generally, they find, like we do, that the public responds to information about environmental concerns.
Data
There are two primary sources of data used in this study: the BLS's Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) 2 and EPA's Health-Based Violations of Drinking Water Standards (VIOLATIONS). 3 Table 3 contains the variable means and standard deviations of all variables, broken down by those who c Tap water use/bottled water use/filtration use d Respondent has knowledge or has received notification from the local water authority of a specific water contamination event/Risk perception about the safety of tap water/ Dissatisfaction about the taste, odor, and appearance of tap water e Their paper is not related to consumer response but supplier behavior. We include this because it is only paper in context of water quality reports, like we do, until now we've found f No purification/Straining/Ordinary filter/Electronic filter/Boiling Table 3 ). The percent of households who consumed any bottled water rose one percentage point per year from 39% to 41%.
VIOLATIONS is a record of the water quality reports (WQRs) which were sent or made available by water utilities to consumers. SWDAA96 focuses on public water systems which the EPA defines as not publicly-owned but rather any water system which provides water for human consumption through pipes or other constructed conveyances, if such system has at least 15 service connections or regularly serve at least 25 individuals. The 1996 Amendments in the United States require water utilities to issue annual water quality reports. In particular, community water system must directly mail their reports to households by July 1 each year if they serve 10,000 or more people. This water quality report must include health based violations if violations occur at systems. EPA collects the information, the number of health based violations of drinking water standards, from public water utilities.
Our primary dependent variable is bottled water expenditure from the CEX. The ideal variable would be direct human tap water consumption, but such data are not available. Aggregate residential tap water consumption data is the closest data which exist, but they include tap water used for all purposes, including all bathroom uses, laundry, and watering lawns. Direct human consumption, according to American Water Works Association [1999] , is only 15.7% of total usage. Therefore we follow the literature (Smith and Desvousges [1986] , Larson and Gnedenko [1999] , Abrahams et al. [2000] and Jakus et al. [2009] ) and use bottled water consumption as a substitute for direct human consumption of tap water.
Our primary explanatory variable is the number of reported health violations from VIOLATIONS. The observations in these data are public water systems (defined above).
The EPA defines three types of public water systems, only one of which considered in this study: community water systems, which supply water to the same population year-round. The excluded utilities are non-transient non-community water systems and transient non-community water systems which provide water either not year-round or not the same population, such as schools, factories, gas stations, or campgrounds. According to United States Environmental Protection Agency [2009] , there are approximately 52,000 community water systems.
SWDAA96 requires that water utilities which serve 10,000 or more people to directly mail their annual water quality reports to their households by July 1 each year and post the reports online. 4 Water utilities which serve fewer than 10,000 people need only post on-line or in local newspapers. We restrict our analysis to community water systems which serve more than 10,000 people. Although these two restrictions limit us to only 2.7% of all water systems in the U.S., they serve 78% of the U.S. population.
To construct our data, we had to map utility-level VIOLATIONS data to household-level CEX data. We used two two criteria: time and geography.
Time: CEX households in each year (2006, 2007, 2008) are matched to VIOLATIONS from the previous year (2005, 2006, 2007) . A, for example, 2007 VIOLATIONS observation contains the data which were sent to consumers in 2008; therefore, we match with 2008 CEX data.
Geography: The key geographic matching variable is county: The CEX has sampling units which contain counties, and water utilities serve counties. Given our data structure, we compute an expected number of violations for each CEX household, given their location. CEX provides codes for the largest 21 Primary Sampling Units or PSUs, which similar to MSAs. See figure 1 for a U.S. map of the 21 PSUs; note that the largest US cities are covered about one-third of the US population lives in one of these PSUs. VIOLATIONS provide the counties that utilities serve, so we requested a list of counties in each PSU from BLS. Then we constructed the expected number of reported violations each person in a PSU received by: (a) multiplying the population served by each utility by the number of violations by each utility; (b) adding this poplation-weighed number of violations across all utilities which serve counties in a given PSU; and then (c) dividing this sum of population-weighted number of violations by the population of the PSU. Formally, consider suppose utilities u = 1, . . . , U are in a given PSU P SU A . Let pop u be the population served by utility u and let vio u be the number of violations by utility u. Then, for all individuals i who live in P SU A , let
Two notes about the geographical match. First, since we use only PSUs, the sample is weighted toward urban households and thus may not accurately describe rural Americans. Second, the violations variable measures a probability that the household received a WQR which indicated a violation, instead of certainty that the household received such a WQR. This means the data likely underestimates the true impact of WQRs on bottled water purchases. The geographic restriction to PSUs further limits the data to 32% of valid community water systems, which as mentioned above, serve about one-third of the U.S. population. Table 4 shows the number of household sampled, the number of water utilities that serve ≥ 10, 000 population, 10, 000 or more populations served by the water utilities, and average 10, 000 or more population served by water utilities with Violations over three years in the study. At least one time, 10.37 % of people received water quality reports with violations from 2006 to 2008. 
Empirical Analysis
Consumers directly receive water quality reports, news of health violations in drinking water, from their water utilities annually. If a consumer receives the report containing many health violations and read these potential health effects of any detected contaminant level that violates drinking water quality standard, she may find tap water less appealing for direct consumption. If so, provision of water quality information induces those who receive violations for drinking water to start finding alternatives to water a Number of water utilities that serve ≥ 10, 000 b pop1: 10,000 or more population served by water utilities in the United States. c pop2: Average 10,000 or more population served by water utilities with Violations over three years, 2005-2007 d There are no violations reported for avoiding consumption of low quality water. In the study, we consider bottled water as an alternative to tap water. Our principal hypothesis is that news of health violations in drinking water causes consumers to purchase bottled water; i.e. along the extensive margin. To test our hypothesis, we take a standard Probit approach. Namely:
where P r(y = 1) is 1 if consumer i decides to buy bottled water and 0 if the consumer decides not to buy bottled water. Φ(·) is the CDF of the normal distribution function. x ′ i is the vector of variables explaining the probability of buying bottled water. β is a parameter vector to be estimated. Table 5 shows the results of three different Probit models. Model 1 excludes PSU fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 exclude two expenditure variables for tea and coffee and other nonalcoholic beverages. In Model 3, we add a Table 6 displays the estimated marginal effects at the mean associated with the parameter values. We found that the coefficients on Violation variables in Model 2 and Model 3 are positive and statistically significant; this indicates that the effect of more violation reports increases the likelihood that people buy bottled water. In Model 3, the marginal effects give the increase in likelihood of buying bottled water by 0.08 for those who received water quality violation report. Table 7 reports the results of the predicted probabilities for purchasing bottled water in the specification of the model 3. (The violation variable is set to 0, 1, and 2, and the other independent variables set at the sample average values.) We ask: what is the estimated increase in the probability of purchasing bottled water as the number of violations reported increases from zero to one? We get roughly 0.4646 -0.3841 = 0.0805. This means that the probability of switching to drinking bottled water is about 8 percentage points (21%) higher when consumers received a report of a water quality violation. As shown in Table  4 , average population served by water utilities with violations reported over three years, 2005-2007, were about 9,600,000. It implies that about 768,000 people started drinking bottled water because of violations holding all other factors constant. Household income is positively and statistically related to expenditures on bottled water. Marginal effects give the increases in the expected people's expenditure on bottled water by 0.0003 with a $1,000 increase in annual income, and by 0.015 for the family which has more members than the family which has less. While the dummy variable of head of households over 64 years old are not statistically significant, the number of members in consumer unit, Family size, are positive and statistically significant. The coefficients on AgeHH are negative and statistically significant, indicating that older people are less likely to spend their money on buying bottled water than those who are younger. Household with children are more likely to consume bottled water than those who are with no children. More educated people are more likely to purchase bottled water than people with less education. About both expenditures on tea and other nonalcoholic beverages, results indicate that consumer's expenditures for them are negatively related to the probability of buying bottled water, suggesting these other beverage are gross substitutes for bottled water. We ran the Probit regression with lagged population weighted violations, which were not statistically significant.
4.1. The impact on the amount of bottled water purchased (the intensive margin). In the previous analysis, we established that receiving news of health violations in drinking water increases consumers' probability of purchasing bottled water. One way also ask: does the news of violations increase the amount of bottled water purchased? To investigate this question, we use the two-step procedure by Heckman [1979] . In first step, using model 3 in Table 5 , we ran a probit model: decision equation for the decision to spend. In second step, we ran an ordinary least squares model to predict expenditure. To get the full effects of water quality information on purchasing bottled water, we obtained the inverse of the Mill's ratio from probit model. Then, we augmented the expenditure regression equation with the inverse of the Mill's ratio. Thus, we can derive consistent estimates of the regression disturbance variance. Appendix A reports the results of bottled water expenditure in these models. The two specifications in models for both probit model and ordinary least square model are the same. In the model 2, we performed bootstrap estimation in second step to obtain consistent estimates of standard errors. We found that Violation from water quality reports is statistically significant in model 2 unlike model 1. We could say that people's weekly average expenditure to purchase bottled water increases $0.78 by one more violation. The coefficient on lambda term (the inverse of the Mill's ratio) suggests that the error terms in decision regression and expenditure regression are positively correlated.
Conclusion
Using the Consumer Expenditure Survey from 2006 to 2008, this paper offers direct micro-level information on an actual action that households are undertaken to avoid or reduce the effects of consumption of bad tap water quality. The main purpose of this paper is to test whether receiving news of health violations in drinking water increases consumers' probability of purchasing bottled water. About 40 percent of our sample was weekly percent reporting any bottle water and weekly average expenditure for bottled water was $4.83 per household unit. We found that one reported water quality violation increases the likelihood that individuals buy bottled water about 8 percentage points, or 21%, higher. It implies that about 768,000 people in the study started drinking bottled water because of water quality violations. To obtain consistent estimates of standard errors, we performed bootstrap estimation c * indicates statistical significance at p < 0.10, ** at p < 0.05, and *** at p < 0.01 d lambda is the inverse of the Mill's ratio obtained from Probit model
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